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Abstract
This paper analyzes the gradual transition of British Petroleum (BP), one of the
world's largest oil and gas companies, into a renewable energy company focused
on sustainability and the reduction of carbon emissions. BP's leadership and ethical
practices are compared before and after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster. The
purpose of the comparison and the broader analysis of the transition is to identify
how effective leadership can be used to transform a company with a suspect social
responsibility record into a leader among its peers. Lessons learned from the
disaster, and the subsequent transition conclude the research.
Keywords: British Petroleum, BP, leadership, ethics, energy, renewables,
corporate social responsibility, fossil fuels, oil, crisis management, stakeholder
management, Deepwater Horizon

Introduction
British Petroleum is a multinational oil, gas, and alternative energy company
headquartered in London, England. The company was founded as the Anglo-Person
Oil Company on April 14th, 1909, shortly after a large deposit of oil was located
by British geologists in what is today southwest Iran, as reported in the “From
Anglo-Persian Oil to BP Amoco” (1998) article. Notable acquisitions include BP’s
purchase of Amoco in 1998 for $48 billion (Moore, 1998) and the purchase of
Standard Oil of Ohio in 1987 for $7.8 billion (Cole, 1987). As reported by The
London Economic (2021), the company also owns a 20% stake in Rosneft, Russia’s
integrated oil and gas provider.
BP is vertically integrated in the oil and gas industry to a high degree; its
exploration, production, refining, marketing and distribution, power generation,
and trading functions are handled internally rather than through arms-length
transactions (Stacey & Crooks, 2016). The alternative energy business unit,
founded in 2005, focuses on solar, wind, and biofuel energy projects and is
integrated to a far lesser extent than the oil and gas unit (Bousso & Twidale, 2017).
BP’s revenues and revenue growth for the last three years and that of the other oil
and gas supermajors are provided in Table 1. The decline in revenues in 2019 is
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attributed to a decline in crude prices, and the sharp decline in 2020 is due to the
global economic downturn associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Table 1
Revenues and Revenue Growth - Oil and Gas Supermajors - 2018 through 2020
(Revenue Figures Expressed in Billions USD)

Company

2018

YoY Δ

2019

YoY Δ

2020

YoY Δ

BP

303.74

24.19%

282.62

-6.95%

183.5

-35.07%

Chevron

166.34

17.37%

146.52

-11.92%

94.69

-35.37%

ConocoPhillips

38.73

18.85%

36.67

-5.31%

19.26

-47.49%

Eni

90.86

13.26%

79.57

-12.43%

51.34

-35.47%

ExxonMobil

290.21

18.76%

264.93

-8.71%

181.5

-31.49%

Royal Dutch Shell
TotalEnergies

396.56
184.106

27.15%
23.48%

352.1
176.25

-11.21%
-4.27%

183.19
119.7

-47.97%
-32.08%

Source: The data was retrieved from Macrotrends (2021). Copyright 2021 by
Macrotrends. Several sites consulted; see References.
BP operates in more than 75 countries and owns roughly 20,300 retail service
stations worldwide (BP, 2020a). Products sold at the service stations include
gasoline, diesel fuel, lubricants, snacks, and beverages. To complement the goods
offered, automotive services, including repairs, maintenance, and inspections, can
be procured at many retail service stations. In addition to their retail service stations,
according to the article “BP buys UK's largest car charging firm Chargemaster”
(2018), BP has expanded their presence in the European electric vehicle charging
station market by acquiring Chargemaster. Furthermore, according to the report
“Aral accelerates ultra-fast charging expansion” (2021), their presence was also
expanded through their Aral brand, which recently announced plans to install 500
fast-charging stations across its fleet of 120 fuel service stations in Germany. BP
is a company in the midst of a significant transition. Though they are one of the
world's largest oil and gas companies, BP has stated that their future relies on
developing and implementing low carbon and renewable energy projects,
particularly wind and solar generation supported by battery storage. BP plans to
finance these renewable energy projects by selling certain oil and gas assets, cutting
their quarterly dividends, reducing investment in new oil and gas projects, and
through the elimination of oil and gas exploration efforts in countries where it does
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not already maintain a presence (Parnell, 2020). This focus on renewable energy is
a stark contrast to other major players in the oil and gas industry, particularly
ExxonMobil, which continues to prioritize investments in traditional oil and gas
projects in their efforts to maximize shareholder returns (Trefis Team, 2021).
Corporate Governance
BP’s management structure consists of a board of directors, led by Chairman of the
Board Helge Lund, and a hierarchical management team led by Chief Executive
Officer Bernard Looney, who also serves on the board of directors. Lund became
chairman on January 1st, 2019, and Looney succeeded Bob Dudley as CEO on
February 5th, 2020. Shortly after the announcement of Looney as the new CEO,
BP released a plan to achieve zero-net carbon emissions by 2050, by transitioning
away from fossil fuels and into renewable energy (BP, 2020b). The pivot to
renewables is a risky decision, but BP believes it is the right thing to do from an
economic perspective, as reliance on fossil fuels is expected to decrease as vehicle
electrification increases, and a sustainability and environmental perspective, as the
company has experienced numerous disasters relating to their oil and gas
infrastructure (Korosec, 2010).
Leadership Disconnect Prior to the 2010 Disaster
Before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP's code of conduct emphasized their
commitment to ethics, a zero-accident culture, safety, and integrity. The occurrence
of the disaster, and several disasters that preceded it, highlight the disconnect that
existed between management's stated values and BP's actual business practices
leading up to 2010. Chazan, Faucon, & Casselman (2010) reported that concerning
BP’s management team, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
deputy secretary Jordan Barab commented that they “claim to be very much
focused on safety, I think sincerely, but somehow their sincerity and their programs
don't always get translated well into the refinery floor." The disconnect between
messaging and practice described by Barab is common among large companies
with a siloed, hierarchical organization structure like BP (Galonek, 2015).
Crisis Management
BP's crisis management has been tested in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. The failure of a blowout preventer, a key component of a drilling rig
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designed to prevent an uncontrolled release of crude oil from a well, combined with
a failure to follow proper maintenance and operational procedures, led to the deaths
of 11 employees and the worst maritime oil spill in history (Tabibzadeh &
Meshkati, 2014). The damage to ecosystems, wildlife, and the environment in and
around the Gulf of Mexico is incalculable. The article “BP Oil Spill Caused $17.2
Billion in Natural Resource Damage” (2017) reports that researchers have
conservatively estimated that it exceeds $17 billion. More than $65 billion in costs
have been incurred by BP due to the disaster (Bousso, 2018). The fact that the
company was able to weather such an unprecedented disaster speaks to their ability
to manage and work through crisis situations.
How BP’s Culture Contributed to the Deepwater Horizon Disaster
BP's ethical record is mixed. Their brand image prior to 2010 emphasized good
corporate citizenship, green credentials, and care for the environment (Balmer,
2010). The company credited their operational and safety performance to their
benchmarking efforts to identify best practices and their ability to measure key
safety metrics, such as injuries, lost time accidents, spills, and adherence to training
and human performance improvement programs. BP's management thought that
they could root out any issues by measuring safety and operational performance.
BP’s corporate culture in the months leading up to the disaster was characterized
as having a relentless focus on cost-cutting (Verschoor, 2010). Lowering costs
allowed BP to maintain its competitiveness with the other supermajors, most
notably Shell, and management and the board of directors wanted to provide the
shareholders with the greatest returns possible. To help keep costs low, BP
instituted a variable pay program; employee compensation would be based, in part,
on their ability to meet the financial, operational, and safety goals set by
management.
What BP management failed to realize is that by tying the meeting of these goals
to employee compensation, they created a conflict of interests for their employees
(Jennings, 2010). When safety and operational goals are tied to compensation, it
creates an incentive for individuals to underreport incidents that require attention.
For example, an employee who witnesses an improper or unsafe operation could
report the issue and risk losing part of their pay or even their job. If they look the
other way and avoid reporting the issue, operations can continue, and they and their
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colleagues will not face any discipline. The problem can be exacerbated by peer
pressure to avoid reporting incidents, as well as pressure from supervisors and
managers who, like employees, are paid based on their ability to meet goals. Each
time an issue is ignored, it becomes easier to ignore future issues. The cycle
continues until a disaster occurs, and management is left wondering how all of the
operations and safety controls they had invested substantial resources in could have
failed.
An example of how safety metrics can be misleading concerns BP’s Texas City
refinery. In 2005, an explosion at the refinery killed 15 workers. An investigation
revealed numerous safety and operational issues that contributed to the explosion
and subsequent loss of life. BP subsequently invested more than $1 billion to
upgrade the Texas City refinery to improve safety and operations. The company
remarked that the investments helped drive down the OSHA recordable injury rate
at the facility every year since 2005 (Chazan, Faucon, & Casselman, 2010). A sixmonth inspection by OSHA of the refinery conducted in 2009 resulted in an $87
million fine to BP (Walter, 2009). Many of the hazards that contributed to the 2005
explosion had not been corrected. While management was celebrating the lower
OSHA incident rate and other improved safety metrics, the lower rate was clearly
not indicative of the actual safety situation in the refinery.
Pivot to Renewables
On August 4th, 2020, BP announced that it was transitioning its business away from
fossil fuels toward renewable and low carbon energy (Hirs, 2020). Specific goals
included the reduction of its carbon footprint by 40% within 10 years, and to
become carbon neutral by 2050. The company also announced that it would not
enter new countries for oil and gas development. The company believed that a
reduction in oil and gas exploration and development activities, in conjunction with
cutting their dividend by half and selling off certain oil and gas infrastructure,
would allow them to conserve cash flow in order to finance a ten-fold increase in
renewable and low carbon energy development (BP, 2020c).
The transition was driven primarily by a crash in oil prices that began in 2018,
combined with forecasts of continued low prices into the foreseeable future
(Horowitz, 2020). Government policies and programs relating to carbon credits and
emissions mandates also played a role. Low oil prices had led BP to realize record
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losses in the second quarter of 2020 (Bousso & Nasralla, 2020). The urgency of the
transition increased as the damaging effects of the economic shutdowns associated
with the COVID-19 pandemic took hold. Figures 1A and 1B show how BP
underperformed the S&P 500 in the months leading up to and following the
pandemic. Figure 2 shows how the oil and gas industry was hit particularly hard by
the economic shutdown relative to the broader economy.
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Source: The data for Figures 1A, 1B and 2 were retrieved from Yahoo! Finance
(2021). Copyright 2021 by Yahoo! Finance. Several sites consulted; see
References.
Reactions to the news of the planned transition were mixed. Environmental
organizations were pleased, though skeptical, given BP's track record concerning
environmental performance and their past failures in the low carbon energy sector
(Smith, 2020). As shown in Figure 3, investor reaction to the news (and the record
quarterly losses) was negative; BP’s holding period returns for the month of August
2020 were worst among oil and gas supermajors.

Source: The data for Figure 3 was retrieved from Yahoo! Finance (2021).
Copyright 2021 by Yahoo! Finance. Several sites consulted; see References.
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Despite the initial negative response among investors, BP continued to argue that
the transition was integral to its future success. Climate change is real, and BP's
management felt that oil and gas companies would be subjected to ever-increasing
pressures by governments to lower emissions and move away from fossil fuels. In
addition, by transitioning to renewables, particularly offshore wind projects, BP
would be in an excellent position to capitalize on hundreds of billions of dollars in
new revenue potential (Jessen, 2021).
BP’s messaging emphasized how the transition would benefit all stakeholders
(Williams-Grut, 2020). Investors would benefit because as the first supermajor to
fully embrace the low carbon and renewable future, BP would gain a significant
first-mover advantage and a greater share of revenues compared to its rivals. It is
estimated that 9% of the world's global greenhouse-gas emissions come from the
oil and gas industry (Bates, Desroches, Rajah, Cosby, & Perrons, 2021). BP's
reduction of carbon emissions by 40% within 10 years and becoming carbon neutral
by 2050 represents meaningful progress in the battle against climate change.
Lessons Learned
The lesson learned from the Deepwater Horizon disaster is that cost-cutting to
satisfy one group of stakeholders (the shareholders, in the case of BP) cannot be
allowed to trump safety, ethical, and operational concerns. By focusing too much
on costs, management can unwittingly create a culture that shows little regard
toward other concerns, including ethics and safety. History has shown that when
ethics and safety are disregarded, all stakeholders are impacted in a negative way.
In contrast, investing in social responsibility creates value for all stakeholders
(Hockerts & Moir, 2004). Better stakeholder management and an understanding of
the need to balance shareholder concerns against other stakeholders' concerns are
necessary to prevent such disasters from occurring.
A second lesson learned from the lead up to the disaster is that while they provide
value, safety metrics by themselves do not present a complete, accurate portrayal
of the safety performance of the workforce. BP's management was convinced that
safety performance had improved in the Texas City refinery following the 2005
explosion that left 15 workers dead. Subsequent safety assessments performed by
OSHA showed that those serious issues remained, contrary to company safety
metrics that showed a marked improvement. Safety metrics need to be
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supplemented with periodic audits and site inspections to ensure that the reported
numbers reflect the true practices of the organization.
BP's transition to renewables teaches us the importance of effective messaging.
Initially, investors, environmental groups, and other stakeholders were skeptical.
BP's messaging emphasized why the transition was needed and how it would
benefit a broad range of stakeholders. Much of the credit belongs to CEO Bernard
Looney and Chairman of the Board, Helge Lund. Looney's views on renewable
energy contrast sharply with those of his predecessor Bob Dudley, who argued that
a broad transition away from fossil fuels was unrealistic (Sedgwick & Turak, 2017).
As Williams-Grut (2020) reported, Lund has shown strong support of Looney’s
vision for the company, stating that the transition is the right thing for BP, its
shareholders, and society. A year into the transition, it is clear that the messaging
has taken root, even amongst investors who had initially criticized the change in
direction (Noffke, 2021).
Conclusion
To say the least, it is ironic that an oil and gas supermajor whose actions contributed
to the worst maritime environmental disaster in history has become a leader in the
global transition to renewable and low carbon energy. BP's actions leading up to
the disaster and its aftermath provide many valuable lessons about how an overemphasis on cost-cutting can harm the safety and operational performance.
Additionally, an overreliance on metrics and analytics can paint a false picture of a
company's actual performance. Site inspections, assessments, and audits, while
expensive, can provide leaders with a more complete understanding of their
organization. Lastly, BP’s transition to renewables shows how effective leadership
and coherent messaging can completely transform the perception of a company. In
BP’s case, they went from having the reputation of a social and environmental
pariah into a company widely recognized for its leadership in the struggle against
climate change.

Published by St. John's Scholar, 2021

9

Journal of Global Awareness, Vol. 2, No. 2 [2021], Art. 7

References
Aral accelerates ultra-fast charging expansion (2021). Automotive World.
Retrieved September 18, 2021, from
https://www.automotiveworld.com/news-releases/aral-accelerates-ultra-fastcharging-expansion/
BP. (2020a). Annual Report.
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/investors/results-andreporting/annual-report.html
BP. (2020b). BP sets ambition for net-zero by 2050, fundamentally changing
organization to deliver. https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-andinsights/press-releases/bernard-looney-announces-new-ambition-for-bp.html
BP. (2020c). From International Oil Company to Integrated Energy Company: BP
sets out strategy for decade of delivery towards net-zero ambition.
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/pressreleases/from-international-oil-company-to-integrated-energy-company-bpsets-out-strategy-for-decade-of-delivery-towards-net-zero-ambition.html
BP buys UK's largest car charging firm Chargemaster. (2018, June 28). BBC
News. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44640647
BP Oil Spill Caused $17.2 Billion in Natural Resource Damage: Virginia Tech
Scientists. (2017). Insurance Journal
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/04/20/448459.htm

Balmer, J. M. (2010). The BP Deepwater Horizon debacle and corporate brand
exuberance. Journal of Brand Management, 18(2), 97-104.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/bm.2010.33
Bates, M., Desroches, L., Rajah, A., Cosby, T., & Perrons, K. (2021). The Energy
Sector’s Other Challenge: How Digital Technologies Can Help the Oil and
Gas Industry Work Toward a Zero-Carbon Future. Journal of Petroleum
Technology. Retrieved September 16, 2021, from https://jpt.spe.org/theenergy-sectors-other-challenge-how-digital-technologies-can-help-the-oiland-gas-industry-work-toward-a-zero-carbon-future

https://scholar.stjohns.edu/jga/vol2/iss2/7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24073/jga/2/02/07

10

Valle: Deepwater Horizon and the Transition to Renewables

Bousso, R. (2018, January 16). BP Deepwater Horizon costs balloon to $65
billion. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-bp-deepwaterhorizon/bpdeepwater-horizon-costs-balloon-to-65-billion-idUKKBN1F50O6?editionredirect=uk

Bousso, R., & Nasralla, S. (2020, August 4). BP halves dividend after record loss,
speeds up reinvention. Yahoo Finance. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bpcuts-dividend-record-loss-062428348.html
Bousso, R., & Twidale, S. (2017, December 15). BP returns to solar with
investment in Lightsource. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/uklightsource-bp-stake/bp-returns-to-solar-with-investment-in-lightsourceidUKKBN1E90GW?edition-redirect=uk

Chazan, G., Faucon, B., & Casselman, B. (2010, June 29.) As CEO Hayward
Remade BP, Safety, Cost Drives Clashed. The Wall Street Journal.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870396410457533515412
6721876
Cole, R. J. (1987, April 29). B.P. in $7.82 billion deal for Standard. The New
York Times, p. 1. Retrieved from The New York Times:
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/29/business/bp-in-7.82-billion-deal-forstandard.html
From Anglo-Persian Oil to BP Amoco. (1998, August 11). BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/149259.stm
Galonek, B. (2015, June 1). Safety suffers in corporate silos. Industrial Safety and
Hygiene News. https://www.ishn.com/articles/101558-safety-suffers-incorporate-silos
Hirs, E. (2020, August 5). BP's Strategic Shift to Renewables. Retrieved from
Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/edhirs/2020/08/05/bps-strategic-shiftto-renewables/
Hockerts, K., & Moir, L. (2004). Communicating Corporate Responsibility to
Investors: The Changing Role of the Investor Relations Function. Journal of
Business Ethics, 52(1), 8598.
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:BUSI.0000033109.35980.16

Published by St. John's Scholar, 2021

11

Journal of Global Awareness, Vol. 2, No. 2 [2021], Art. 7

Horowitz, J. (2020, June 8). BP to cut 10,000 jobs because of oil price crash.
Retrieved from CNN Business:
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/08/business/bp-job-cuts/index.html
Jennings, M. M. (2010). What BP Teaches us about Ethics, Risk, and Business
Management. Corporate Finance Review, 15(2), 38-42. Retrieved from
ProQuest ABI/Inform:
https://www.proquest.com/docview/801297205
Jessen, C. (2021, March 4). BP Is Aggressive On Renewables With Good Reason.
Retrieved from Seeking Alpha: https://seekingalpha.com/article/4411318bp-aggresive-renewables-good-reason
Korosec, K. (2010, May 7). BP's History of Oil Spills and Accidents: Same
Strategy, Different Day. Retrieved from CBS News:
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bps-history-of-oil-spills-and-accidentssame-strategy-different-day/
Macrotrends. (2021). Revenues and revenue growth for oil and gas supermajors,
2018 through 2020 [Table].
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/bp/bp/revenue
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/COP/conocophillips/revenue
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/CVX/chevron/revenue
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/E/eni-spa/revenue
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/XOM/exxon/revenue
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/RDS.B/royal-dutch-shell/revenue
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/TTE/totalenergies-se/revenue

Moore, J. F. (1998, August 11). BP to acquire Amoco. Retrieved from CNN
Money: https://money.cnn.com/1998/08/11/deals/bp/

https://scholar.stjohns.edu/jga/vol2/iss2/7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24073/jga/2/02/07

12

Valle: Deepwater Horizon and the Transition to Renewables

Noffke, S. (2021, August 6). Shell and BP: why we are hopeful for a sensible
transition to renewables. Retrieved from Investment Week:
https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/opinion/4035466/shell-bp-hopefulsensible-transition-renewables
Parnell, J. (2020, August 4). BP Aims to Build 50GW of Renewables by 2030, Cut
Fossil Fuel Output by 40%. Retrieved from Greentech Media:
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/bp-to-invest-5b-a-year-onlow-carbon-and-cut-fossil-fuel-output-by-40-percent-by-2030
Sedgwick, S., & Turak, N. (2017, November 14). BP CEO Dudley: ‘Politicians
need to get more educated or be more honest’. Retrieved from CNBC:
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/14/bp-ceo-dudley-politicians-need-to-getmore-educated-or-be-more-honest.html
Smith, B. (2020, August 11). BP: The Energy Transition and Renewables.
Retrieved from GreenBarrel: http://greenbarrel.com/2020/08/11/bp-theenergy-transition-and-renewables/
Stacey, K., & Crooks, E. (2016, June 12). Financial Times. Retrieved from Oil
majors find virtue in integration: https://www.ft.com/content/8ff8ec62-2dcc11e6-a18d-a96ab29e3c95
Tabibzadeh, M., & Meshkati, N. (2014). Learning from the BP Deepwater
Horizon accident: risk analysis of human and organizational factors in
negative pressure test. Environment Systems & Decisions, 34(2), 194-207.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10669-014-9497-2
The London Economic. (2021, February 8). Why BP's green future depends on
Rosneft. Retrieved from The London Economic:
https://www.thelondoneconomic.com/business-economics/business/whybps-green-future-depends-on-rosneft-219698/
Trefis Team. (2021, June 4). Banking on Renewables? Pick BP Stock Over Exxon.
Retrieved from Forbes:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2021/06/04/banking-onrenewables-pick-bp-stock-over-exxon/

Published by St. John's Scholar, 2021

13

Journal of Global Awareness, Vol. 2, No. 2 [2021], Art. 7

Verschoor, C. (2010). BP Still Hasn't Learned Ethical Lessons. Strategic Finance,
92(2), 13-15. Retrieved October 23, 2021 from The Free Library
https://www.thefreelibrary.com/BP+still+hasn%27t+learned+ethical+lesson
s.-a0236484919October
Walter, L. (2009, October 30). OSHA Proposes Record $87 Million in Fines
Against BP. Retrieved from EHS Today:
https://www.ehstoday.com/standards/osha/article/21911384/osha-proposesrecord-87-million-in-fines-against-bp
Williams-Grut, O. (2020, February 12). New BP CEO pledges to make oil giant
carbon neutral by 2050. Retrieved from Yahoo Finance:
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bp-carbon-neutral-2050-bernard-looney114838285.html
Yahoo! Finance. (2021) S&P 500 Performance and Oil & Gas Supermajors Stock
Performance – January 2019 through July 2021 [Figures 1A, 1B, 2 and 3].
GSPC:https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EGSPC/history?period1=154630
0800&period2=1627776000&interval=1wk&filter=history&frequency=1wk
&includeAdjustedClose=true
BP:https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/BP/history?period1=1546300800&pe
riod2=1627776000&interval=1d&filter=history&frequency=1d&include
AdjustedClose=true
COP:https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/cop/history?period1=1546300800&
period2=1627776000&interval=1wk&filter=history&frequency=1wk&in
cludeAdjustedClose=true
CVX:https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/cvx/history?period1=1546300800
&period2=1627776000&interval=1wk&filter=history&frequency=1wk&i
ncludeAdjustedClose=true
E:https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/e/history?period1=1546300800&perio
d2=1627776000&interval=1wk&filter=history&frequency=1wk&include
AdjustedClose=true

https://scholar.stjohns.edu/jga/vol2/iss2/7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24073/jga/2/02/07

14

Valle: Deepwater Horizon and the Transition to Renewables

RDS-A:https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/rdsa/history?period1=1546300800&period2=1627776000&interval=1wk&fil
ter=history&frequency=1wk&includeAdjustedClose=true
TTE:https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/tte/history?period1=1546300800&p
eriod2=1627776000&interval=1wk&filter=history&frequency=1wk&incl
udeAdjustedClose=true
XOM:https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/xom/history?period1=1546300800
&period2=1627776000&interval=1wk&filter=history&frequency=1wk&i
ncludeAdjustedClose=true

Published by St. John's Scholar, 2021

15

